New School Economic Review

When the U.S. last defaulted

by Benjamin on July 15, 2011

I am grabbing this across from a seperate blog (the history of economics playground) because I think this is something to bear in mind as the media enters its final stage of Debt-ceiling coverage over the coming fortnight. Of course there may be more, but for now…

Two things seem to be taken for granted in the current debt-ceiling debate: 1. The parties will come to an agreement on the debt ceiling because 2. These United States have never defaulted and will not start now. Well, Lexington has eight pretty good reasons why an agreement is not inevitable and as far as I can tell, the United States has defaulted in the past, and we need to recognize that fact…

The historical trick revolves around ‘these united states’ because these 50 States are somewhat recent. Hawaii and Alaska would finalize statehood in ’59. but various make-ups of the USA have indeed defaulted or re-structured its debt. Most recently – I think – was in 1933 when the then 48 State government refused to repay the gold annuity it owed to Panama. This was eventually repaid in 1936. I take that observation, and many more from Rogoff and Reinhart’s book (2010: 112-3) which I have commented on earlier.

We can add to that list debt restructuring in 1790, where interest was deferred by the government for ten years. Then there are State cases where the central government allowed default on debts and – I would suggest – implicitly accepts government default: 1841-42 when three States repudiated their debts altogether and 1873-83/4 where ten states were in default, with West Virginia not settling its account till 1919. One could throw in the confederate army debentures and bonds which for various reasons were never repaid to foreign investors, but whether that is legitimate US debt, I am not sure.

My point is simply that the USA has deferred, restructured or cancelled its debt before. If Lexington is right that “compromise may still be possible, but there is nothing inevitable about it,” then on track record you might expect to see an announcement to delay repayment of certain debts, for a long while, on 2 August.

Debtris. Or where can I find $21bn

by Benjamin on January 2, 2011

Here is a wonderful concept by David McCandless: Make a visual impression of what all those billion’s of dollars discussed in the press, and put the pictures side by side to get a sense of perspective. Then animate it and hum the tetris soundtrack (you may have to do that yourself) and see what the $3bn OPEC climate change fund looks like, how big the national debt interest payments are and what the crisis really cost… Kudos.

David Harvey – The crisis of capitalism

by Benjamin on December 15, 2010

A little bit of bliss in this ten minute talk by Prof. David Harvey, and his take on what’s happened in the crisis, what the various explanations are, and what we should do. Beautifully rendered by the people from RSAnimate.

Hope you enjoy it as much as I did :)

Economics, the “Fantasyland”

by Benjamin on December 2, 2010

‘Fantasyland’ is not my term, rather, and here I am shamelessly borrowing from Dan Hirschman’s excellent blog, it is what MIT’s Richard Caballero calls economics in the JEP issue on ‘macroeconomics after the crisis‘, as Dan writes (1. Dec 2010):

When a high-profile MIT economist in an AEA-sponsored journal can accuse the core of his subfield of descending “deeper and deeper into a Fantasyland”, I wonder what economic sociology is to do. I mean, we’re not going to come up with better, more authoritative critiques of the unreality of the field than that!

And just so we don’t take it out of context, here be Caballero’s paragraph on the problem with the core of the discipline in its full glory:

I think this incremental strategy may well have overshot its peak and may lead us to a minimum rather than a maximum in terms of capturing realistic macroeconomic phenomena. We are digging ourselves, one step at a time, deeper and deeper into a Fantasyland, with economic agents who can solve richer and richer stochastic general equilibrium problems containing all sorts of frictions. Because the “progress” is gradual, we do not seem to notice as we accept what are increasingly absurd behavioral conventions and stretch the intelligence and information of underlying economic agents to levels that render them unrecognizable. (Caballero 2010: 90)

Now, what do we do about it?

93% of Icelandic voters refuse to pay back loan

by Benjamin on March 7, 2010

This morning, Icelands voters said no thank you to the compromise between their government and the Anglo-Dutch claim for recompensation after the collapse of Landsbanki and the ICEsave scheme they ran, where British and Dutch people had saved a hefty $5.3bn. Reading that back, it seems unfair that the people of Britain and the Netherlands should not be compensated, but there is a rather important detail which is missed by the usual commentary on this. This money was not saved. It was invested. The people who chose to send their money to Iceland, did so as a calculated investment decision. In the UK that happened via a savings account with Landsbanki or putting your money into bonds or ISA’s.  The return was high while the perceived risk of an ISA – promoted by tax incentives from the UK government – was low.

5%+ return and no risk... Some things are too good to be true

But then Landsbanki went bankrupt and their English and Dutch branches shut down, unable to repay deposits, the host governments went for the Icelandic government’s jugular - demanding the repayment of all UK/Dutch money held in the banks. Two things strike me: 1. If you put your money into an ISA or bond with a foreign bank, you are an investor. If the investment doesn’t pay off, you lose. Why should the Icelandic population bear the cost of your bad investment choice? (They’re already paying for their own bad choices). If anyone is wondering why the Icelandic people voted NO to a $16,400 debt per capita yesterday, I think it was not just the amount of money. It was about not re-compensating bad investment choices by relatively richer foreigners. By the way, in the UK, the minimum deposits/investments ranged from $10,000-$50,000, which investors could deposit tax free – this is not a domestic savings account for the low income person. 2: If a bank goes bankrupt, it is the host governments responsibility to insure against deposits being forfeited, even when that bank is foreign – although one would expect some guarantees to have been lodged with the central bank prior to the banking license being issued. That leaves the buck with the UK and Dutch governments, not the Icelandic one. Not a pleasant prospect in this day of growing government deficits.

That last part is where the argument is now centered. But the fact remains that a large proportion of the money lost in the Landsbanki collapse were investments into bonds and ISA’s. Investments always have some risk, and I’m sure there isn’t the same outcry of government support for those people who lost money on the Icelandic bond or stock market. Why not? Because I think we’ve confused an investment for saving. Which is an easy mistake to make, they are supposed to equal after all.

The effects of crisis on distribution

by Benjamin on March 6, 2010

Yesterday the New School played host to a veritable who’s who of economists concerned with distribution and inequality as “The Effects of Crisis on Distribution” one-day Conference. Over the coming days I will try and get some more of the content of the conference, but with sessions attended by the UN, World Bank, and several other institutions academic and policy-oriented the session on the perceived worsening of US inequality, development and the fall-out from the crisis there was a lot on the table. [the overview is here] Well done to the conference organisers, all of them students, who have been working at this since June! Conferences take time to do, but they are well worth it. Hope you’ve all had a good nights well-deserved sleep.

Dr. Krugman & Mr. Paul… and Ms. McCloskey

by Benjamin on September 12, 2009

Dr. Krugman & Mr. Paul?

Beatrice Cherrier, wrote a great piece on Krugman’s recent article and his relationship with mathematics today (“let’s have math in economics — but as our servant, not our master” ) and in the past (p. 1213) (“In the food sector we suppose that there are constant returns to scale…”). By coincidence, I was downloading a recent draft of McCloskey’s next book – which she kindly provides free drafts of – when I came across her 2002 article/booklet “The Secret Sins of Economics“.

Herein she makes the argument – which she has been making for years – that economics has become, and continues to be a discipline dominated by two failed approaches to doing scientific work: Qualitative Theorising – i.e. solving equilibria in constructed fantasies – and the use of statistical significance as a test for significance – we focus on the t-test, when you should care about the coefficient.

Both McCloskey and Krugman like the maths, and they want to see its use prosper in economics: But Paul Krugman is seemingly caught between his post-nobel public calls for reform (the Dr. Paul, Beatrice describes) and his academic (past?) self who is knee-deep in axiomatic models (Mr. Krugman). Deirdre McCloskey seems to be whole-heartedly in the game to change the discipline. Maybe it’t time for Mr. Krugman to retire, if he hasn’t already?

A lot of talk of change… where’s the action?

by Benjamin on August 16, 2009

How bad are things when economists are writing the Queen of Britain first to explain why they were wrong, and now to say that the economists who admitted they were wrong, were also wrong… The queen herself asked questions of the profession and its failure to see the crisis coming as far back as July 2008, and what did ‘we’ have to offer as an answer?

Everyone seemed to be doing their own job properly on its own merit. And according to standard measures of success, they were often doing it well. The failure was to see how collectively this added up to a series of interconnected imbalances over which no single authority had jurisdiction. This, combined with the psychology of herding and the mantra of financial and policy gurus, lead to a dangerous recipe. Individual risks may rightly have been viewed as small, but the risk to the system as a whole was vast.

For anyone whose even opened one of the Minsky books or even a bit of Taleb this will be familiar territory – even the description of the market. But lets leave that aside. The retort from a new group of economist is that the education of economists, on all educational levels, is insufficient, as it lacks institutional, historical and sociological context. So far so good. What can we do to help the situation:

Models and techniques are important. But given the complexity of the global economy, what is needed is a broader range of models and techniques governed by a far greater respect for substance, and much more attention to historical, institutional, psychological and other highly relevant factors.

Skidelsky himself wrote something similar, and very interesting in the FT a couple of days ago [cached by google here], but here’s an obvious question… What action is taken beyond talk??? The latest instalment of the American Economic Review seems to almost not have noticed any change, and frankly why should it? There’s a year long back-log and it doesn’t look like a revolution is about to happen wit hthe foundations of the discipline. Especially when the ‘official’ reply from the discipline seems unable to step aside from models which cannot include a crisis in its analysis (cf. Robert Lucas’s reply) and the ‘dissenters’ who want do not want to change the discipline but would like a ‘broader range’ of models… It’s a long road ahead I fear.

FT asks: What is the point of economists?

by Benjamin on July 29, 2009

Today’s blog debate in the Financial Times Arena asks a simple and provocative question: “What is the point of economists?”

“Why did no one see the crisis coming?” Queen Elizabeth asked last year. “A failure of the collective imagination of many bright people” who were all “doing their job properly on its own merit”, was the answer many of those bright people gave in a letter to the Queen last week.

If the economics profession could not warn the public about the credit crunch and the recession, what is the profession’s raison d’etre? Did this reflect, as some claim, that economics has gone astray with models that no longer help understand economic reality but rather distort it? Did such models even contribute to the crisis? FT writers and outside experts will set out their views in the posts below. What is the point of economists? What do you think? Click on the “62 comments” button to take part.

As one might expect, the debate is ongoing and interesting, but I have to admit that some answers in particular struck me. The argument was that the problem started in Finance, and Economics and Finance only mesh at the micro level, so “very few financial people cared because they knew nothing about macroeconomics” (comment 3), others are pretty adamant that “A lot of people were really good at math, but very poor at history” (comment 5, 7,… etc).

The New Yorker knows what caused the crisis

by Benjamin on May 23, 2009

Finally, we have a conclusive answer to where the liquidity-financial-economic crisis came from. The New Yorker provides the answer, via the History of Economics Playground, and here it is, in all it’s glory:

This crisis is the culmination of events and trends reaching back, depending on your perspective, four, seven, seventeen, twenty-two, twenty-seven, thirty-eight, sixty-five, or a hundred and two years. (…) The causes are technological, mathematical, cultural, demographic, financial, economic, behavioral, legal, and political. Among the dozens of contributors and culprits, real or perceived, are the personal computer, the abandonment of the gold standard, the abandonment of Glass-Steagall, the end of fixed commissions, the rating agencies, mortgage-backed securities, securitization in general, credit derivatives, credit-default swaps, Wall Street partnerships going public, the League of Nations, Bretton Woods, Basel II, CNBC, the S.E.C., disintermediation, overcompensation, Barney Frank and Chris Dodd, Phil Gramm and Jim Leach, Alan Greenspan, black swans, red tape, deregulation, outdated regulation, lax enforcement, government pressure to lower lending standards, predatory lending, mark-to-market accounting, hedge funds, private-equity firms, modern finance theory, risk models, “quants,” corporate boards, the baby boomers, flat-screen televisions, and an indulgent, undereducated populace.

I am glad we sorted that out.